Seton Hall University

eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship

2017

Examining Powell, A New Wrinkle in an Old
Debate
Christian F. Corro

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Corro, Christian F., "Examining Powell, A New Wrinkle in an Old Debate" (2017). Law School Student Scholarship. 863.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/863

Seton Hall Law

Christian Corro
Circuit Review Note
02-22-16
Examining Powell, A New Wrinkle In An Old Debate
Burden of producing a license as a defense to firearm possession charge did not clearly violate due
process
INTRODUCTION
An elderly man closes up his shop after a long day of work. He has owned this shop for the
last 20 years. Recently there have been some break-ins and some of his merchandise was stolen.
He has had to install extra security measures to protect his merchandise. He looks around before
he pulls down the metal gate to lock up shop. He begins to walk home. He only lives a couple
blocks away. The neighborhood has become increasingly run down because the economy has
suffered. He has noticed some other stores around his have closed. There has also been an increase
in muggings in the neighborhood and the storeowner fears for his safety. The man holds his lunch
box filled with an empty container of food, his earnings for the day, and a pistol. He has owned
the pistol for thirty years or so. The gun was passed down from his father when he passed away.
The man never liked guns, but with the increase in violence, he felt it was necessary to keep it with
him at his business and at home.
The storeowner is walking on his normal route when he sees a man walking towards the
end of the block walking in his direction. As the man approaches the storeowner doesn’t recognize
him, and grabs his lunch box a little tighter towards his chest. As the stranger approaches he asks,
“Do you have a lighter,” while stopping in front of the storeowner.

The storeowner replies, “No sorry,” as he tries to move around the man. But the stranger
quickly sidesteps and blocks his path.
The stranger chuckles, “What’s in the bag old man?”
The storeowner retreats a step backwards, “Please, I’m just trying to get home, the---”
“Open the bag,” the assailant interrupts as he slowly pulls a box cutter from his pocket.
The man instinctively thinks maybe he can try to scare his assailant away with the gun. After all
he cannot afford to loose his earnings for the day. He begins to open the lunch box, and grabs the
handle of the pistol. The assailant seeing the handle appear out of the lunch box lunges and smacks
the pistol down on the ground. The two men begin to grapple. They end up on the floor, with the
assailant on top. The younger and stronger assailant begins to drive the box cutter blade slowly
down toward the storeowner’s chest despite his efforts to repel the assailant. The storeowner turns
away as a tear rolls down his face. In his despair he sees the pistol just within reach. In a last ditch
effort to save his life; he redirects the blade trajectory away from his body to the side. The blade
hits the concrete floor. The storeowner kicks away, just enough to reach out for the gun and shoots
his assailant before he recuperated. The storeowner sits up and stares at the man, and realizes he
just killed a man.
The police arrive, and take the storeowner’s statement. Can the storeowner be charged with
illegal possession of a firearm? Clearly he was using the gun in self-defense. However in some
states it is illegal to carry a gun without a license. So can the storeowner be charged with possessing
a firearm, without a license, even though he only intended to carry the gun back and forth between
work and his home, where he is allowed to keep a firearm for self-defense. Does there exist a
fundamental right to possess a firearm outside the home for self-defense? If the police do charge

the storeowner with possession of a firearm without a license, must the State or the defendant
prove the existence of a proper license? Does making the defendant must prove he has a valid
license to carry violate Due Process? The answer to these questions depends on what state you are
in. This article analyzes how the different circuits have struggled to define the outer limits of the
Second Amendment, whether there exists a right to carry a firearm outside the home for selfdefense, and finally whether an evidentiary presumption exists in court that you may possess a
firearm outside the home for self-defense.
SECOND AMENDMENT
One in three Americans owns a gun, and not too long ago in 2011 the percentage of adults
with a gun in their home or on their property was the highest since 1993.1 Over 108,000 (108,476)
people in America are shot in murders, assaults, suicides and suicide attempts, unintentional
shootings, or by police intervention.2 With all the recent gun violence in the news, there has been
public outcry to place increased limitations on the right to bear arms. Given the tension in this
country over gun violence, it is helpful to first re-examine the Second Amendment, and the right
to bear arms. The Second Amendment provides, “a well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”3
What this article does is examine is examine the Second Amendment. In particular this
article examines the right to bear arms, the limitations on that right, the justifications for those
limits, and what level of scrutiny should apply to those limits. More specifically we examine how

1

See Lydia Saad, Self-Reported Gun Ownership in U.S. Is Highest Since 1993, Gallup (Oct. 26, 2011),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/150353/Self-Reported-Gun-Ownership-Highest-1993.aspx (explaining 47% reported
gun ownership in October 2011). Contrasting this with a decrease in reported gun ownership in the early 1990s, the
data suggests “that attitudes [towards firearms] may again be changing.”
2
http://www.bradycampaign.org/key-gun-violence-statistics.
3
U.S. Const. amend. II.

the courts in Massachusetts’ have interpreted Massachusetts’ Laws concerning the Second
Amendment and how Massachusetts compares to other states.
Based on both the text and history, the Second Amendment conferred an individual right
to keep and bear arms.4 However, the right is not unlimited, just as the First Amendment's right of
free speech is not.5 Therefore, we do not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of
citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to
protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.6
Many of the important issues surrounding the Second Amendment arise over what
limitations can be placed on the right to bear arms. For example, there have been longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.7
A related question is what standard of review should these limitations be subjected to?
Should strict scrutiny apply? The Supreme Court has not specified a particular level of scrutiny or
other means-ends test that should govern Second Amendment issues, although Heller did declare
that the right must be protected by something more demanding than mere rational basis scrutiny.8

4

D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008).
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008).
6
Heller, 554 U.S. at 595.
7
Id. at 626-27.
8
Id. at 628 n.27; Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer's Triumph in the Third Battle Over the Second Amendment, 80 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 703, 752 (2012) at note 4, at 716-17.
5

Courts therefore tend to regard the matter as coming down to a choice between intermediate
scrutiny and strict scrutiny, and most choose the former.9
The Supreme Court has always been very cautious in determining the outer limits of the
Second Amendment. In recent years, the Supreme Court has provided some clarity. In D.C. v.
Heller, the Court struck down the District of Columbia's ban on handgun possession and its
prohibition on keeping operable firearms in the home, holding that each of these laws violated the
Second Amendment.10 The Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment secures a limited
individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense of hearth and home unconnected to
organized militia.11 Furthermore, the Court suggested that the right to bear arms “guarantee[s] the
individual right to .... carry weapons in case of confrontation.”12 In McDonald v. City of Chicago,
the plaintiffs were Chicago residents who desired to keep a handgun in their residences for selfdefense; one was a resident of a high-crime neighborhood who had been threatened by drug
dealers, and another had been the victim of a home burglary.13 The court seemed to follow a pattern
of focusing on self-defense as a purpose for the Second Amendment in their analysis. Because
Chicago's handgun ban was essentially identical to the District of Columbia ban struck down in
Heller, the only issue in the case was whether the individual right to keep and bear arms recognized
by the Second Amendment was made applicable, or “incorporated,” against state and local

9

See, e.g., Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138; Drake, 724 F.3d at 435; Schrader, 704 F.3d at 989; Kachalsky v. Cnty. of
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 96-97 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013); Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., Inc.,
700 F.3d at 205; Staten, 666 F.3d at 159. But see Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 13-1876, 2014 WL
7181334, at *17 (6th Cir. Dec. 18, 2014) (opting to apply strict scrutiny rather than intermediate scrutiny in Second
Amendment cases).
10
Heller, 554 U.S. at 595.
11
Id. at 570.
12
Id. at 584 (2008) (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting))
(ellipses omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13
McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 748, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894 (2010).

governments by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.14 Ultimately, a majority of the
Supreme Court agreed that the Second Amendment “right to keep and bear arms for the purpose
of self-defense” is a fundamental constitutional right that is protected, through the Fourteenth
Amendment, against infringement by state or local governments to the full extent that the Second
Amendment protects the same right against federal infringement.15 However both Heller and
McDonald fell short of answering the pertinent question of whether the Second Amendment
provides a right to possess a firearm outside the home for self-defense.16
There is a current circuit split on the issue.17 Several circuits have boldly decided to enter
into the fray. However there are also circuits who have declined to answer this question, in hopes
the Supreme Court will answer the issue. For example, the Third Circuit, in Drake v. Filko,18
considered the Second Amendment's rights outside of the home and rebuffed a challenge to New
Jersey's “justifiable need” requirement for the issuance of a firearm carry permit. 19 Instead, it
simply assumed that the Second Amendment applied outside of the home,20 and held that the
requirement of a “justifiable need” to bear arms outside of the home did not violate the Second
Amendment's core protection of self-defense.21

14

Michael P. O'Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (i): Judicial Tradition and the Scope
of "Bearing Arms" for Self-Defense, 61 Am. U. L. Rev. 585, 617-18 (2012).
15
Id.
16
See, e.g., Kachalsky v. Cacace, 817 F. Supp. 2d 235, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating that Heller did not discuss the
Second Amendment right outside of the home), aff'd sub nom. Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d
Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013).
17
See, e.g., Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 934 (7th Cir. 2012) (challenging an Illinois statute that prohibited
carrying an easily accessible, loaded firearm); see also Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 868 (4th Cir. 2013)
(stating that the lower court determined the Second Amendment extended outside the home), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
422 (2013).
18
Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013).
19
Id. at 429–30 (concluding that the “justifiable need” requirement is a longstanding prohibition on Second
Amendment protections and, thus, presumptively valid under the Second Amendment).
20
Id. at 440 (focusing on the regulations' failure to burden Second Amendment rights).
21
Id.

This issue as to whether there exists a right to possess a firearm outside the home for selfdefense has led to a lot of difficulties in the lower courts in interpreting the Second Amendment.
Particularly many courts have struggled in reasoning what level of judicial scrutiny should apply
to possessing a firearm outside the home for self-defense after Heller; as well as what evidentiary
presumptions exist as to someone who possesses a firearm outside the home without a license to
carry. The First Circuit’s ruling in Powell v. Tompkins, provides an interesting wrinkle in the
ongoing debate. Powell dealt with a state law that creates an evidentiary presumption that
possession of a firearm outside the home is unlawful. The First Circuit rules that such a law does
not clearly violate the U.S. Constitution.22 There are, however, opinions from the Second, Seventh,
and Ninth circuits suggesting that the Second Amendment does provide a right to possess firearms
outside the home for self-defense.
MASSACHUSETTS LAW
To understand Massachusetts’s law on firearms it is important to note that The Declaration
of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution provides the private citizen no right to keep and bear
arms.23 All gun owners are required to be licensed in Massachusetts.24 There are several ways to
go about getting a license to possess a firearm.25 One-way is to get either get a Class A or a Class
B license.26
Under Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 140, § 131, All licenses to carry firearms shall be designated
Class A or Class B, and the issuance and possession of any such license shall be subject to the
following conditions and restrictions:

22

Powell v. Tompkins, 783 F.3d 332, 340 (1st Cir. 2015).
18A Mass. Prac., Municipal Law and Practice § 16.10 (5th ed.).
24
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 140, § 131, (West).
25
§ 131, (West).
26
§ 131, (West).
23

(a) A Class A license shall entitle a holder thereof to purchase, rent,
lease, borrow, possess and carry: (i) firearms, including large
capacity firearms, and feeding devices and ammunition therefor, for
all lawful purposes, subject to such restrictions relative to the
possession, use or carrying of firearms as the licensing authority
deems proper; and (ii) rifles and shotguns, including large capacity
weapons, and feeding devices and ammunition therefor, for all
lawful purposes; provided, however, that the licensing authority
may impose such restrictions relative to the possession, use or
carrying of large capacity rifles and shotguns as it deems proper…
(b) A Class B license shall entitle a holder thereof to purchase, rent,
lease, borrow, possess and carry: (i) non-large capacity firearms and
feeding devices and ammunition therefor, for all lawful purposes,
subject to such restrictions relative to the possession, use or carrying
of such firearm as the licensing authority deems proper; provided,
however, that a Class B license shall not entitle the holder thereof to
carry or possess a loaded firearm in a concealed manner in any
public way or place; and provided further, that a Class B license
shall not entitle the holder thereof to possess a large capacity
firearm, except under a Class A club license issued under this
section or under the direct supervision of a holder of a valid Class A
license at an incorporated shooting club or licensed shooting range;
and (ii) rifles and shotguns, including large capacity rifles and
shotguns, and feeding devices and ammunition therefor, for all
lawful purposes; provided, however, that the licensing authority
may impose such restrictions relative to the possession, use or
carrying of large capacity rifles and shotguns as he deems proper.27

The main difference between the two is that a person with a Class B license is prohibited
from the purchase, rent, lease, possession, and carrying of a large capacity firearm. 28 Another
essential difference is that Class B license holders are prohibited from possessing a loaded firearm
in a concealed manner in any public way or place.29
Under Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 140, § 122, The chief of police or the board or officer
having control of the police in a city or town, or persons authorized by them, may, after an

27

§ 131, (West).
§ 131, (West).
29
§ 131, (West).
28

investigation into the criminal history of the applicant to determine eligibility for a license under
this section, grant a license to any person except an alien, a minor, a person who has been
adjudicated a youthful offender, as defined in section fifty-two of chapter one hundred and
nineteen, including those who have not received an adult sentence or a person who has been
convicted of a felony or of the unlawful use, possession or sale of narcotic or harmful drugs, to
sell, rent or lease firearms, rifles, shotguns or machine guns, or to be in business as a gunsmith.30
The licensing authority to whom such application is made shall cause one copy of said applicant's
fingerprints to be forwarded to the department of the state police, who shall within a reasonable
time thereafter advise such authority in writing of any criminal record of the applicant. 31 The fee
for an application for a license issued under this section shall be $100, which shall be payable to
the licensing authority and shall not be prorated or refunded in case of revocation or denial.32 A
person refused a license may, within ten days, apply to the state commissioner of public safety for
such license.33 The local authority issuing or renewing a license must send notice of its action to
the state commissioner.34
Under Massachusetts’s law, in processing an application for a license to carry a firearm,
the licensing authority is required to conduct a two-step inquiry to determine the applicant's
eligibility.35 In the first step, the licensing authority looks at the applicant's personal suitability for

30

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 140, § 122 (West).
§ 122 (West).
32
§ 122 (West).
33
§ 122 (West).
34
§ 122 (West).
35
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 140, § 131, (West).
31

gun ownership.36 At the second step, the licensing authority is required to consider whether the
applicant has a “proper purpose” for carrying a firearm.37
Another way to legally possess a firearm in Massachusetts is to obtain a Firearm
Identification Card.38 The Firearm Identification Card allows a person to possess a firearm in his
home or to carry a shotgun or rifle.39 This card does not authorize the carrying of a pistol or
revolver. For this privilege, a license to carry is necessary.40
Under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, criminal sanctions may be imposed on, among others:
(a) Whoever, except as provided or exempted by statute, knowingly
has in his possession .... a firearm, loaded or unloaded, as defined in
[ch. 140, § 121] without either:
(1) being present in or on his residence or place of business; or
(2) having in effect a license to carry firearms issued under [ch. 140,
§ 131 governing licensure];....
(h)(1) Whoever owns, possesses or transfers a firearm, rifle, shotgun
or ammunition without complying with [ch. 140 § 129C governing
FID cards]....41
Therefore, to lawfully possess and carry a firearm within the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts a person must either obtain a license to do so or be exempt from the normal
licensing requirements.42 Additionally, unless an individual standing accused of unlawfully
possessing a firearm produces evidence at trial demonstrating licensure, state law presumes that
he or she is not licensed in accordance with Section 7 of the Massachusetts criminal procedure.43

36

§ 131, (West).
§ 131, (West).
38
32 Mass. Prac., Criminal Law § 306 (3d ed.).
39
§ 306.
40
§ 306.
41
see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, §§ 10(a), (h),
42
See generally Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, §§ 121–131P; Hightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 65 (1st
Cir.2012) (surveying Massachusetts law)
43
See Commonwealth v. Davis, 359 Mass. 758, 270 N.E.2d 925, 926 (1971) (noting that the section 7 criminal
procedure provision “allows the defendant to show that his conduct is within an exception to the proscription” on
carrying firearms).
37

The Section 7 criminal procedure provision is a rule of state criminal procedure that applies in an
array of criminal prosecutions beyond the firearms context.44
This statute from Massachusetts is not uncommon but definitely one of the strictest in the
country. Massachusetts has some of the toughest gun laws in the country, giving local licensing
authorities the power to determine who can obtain a concealed carry permit.45 The preliminary
issue that this statute raises is whether failing to have a license is an element of the crime.
The Dissent in Powell concluded that in Massachusetts, a lack of a license is an element of
the offense of possessing a gun without a license.46 The dissent relied on the clear text of Powell's
criminal complaint and the Massachusetts statutes, the unclear gloss on those statutes supplied by
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), and the comparison to other jurisdictions.47 The
Court noted that the titles of the relevant counts are “Firearm Without FID Card, Possess” and
“Firearm, Carry Without License.” (emphasis added).48 Likewise, the descriptions of the counts
against Powell repeat the “without a license” phrase.49 Furthermore, one of the relevant statutes
provides: “Whoever ... possesses .... a firearm .... without complying with the [FID card] provisions
.... shall be punished by imprisonment....” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 10(h)(1) (emphasis added).50
The other relevant statute provides: “Whoever .... has in his possession .... a firearm .... without ....
having in effect a license .... shall be punished by imprisonment....” Id. § 10(a) (emphasis added).51

44

Powell, 783 F.3d at 339.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, §131(a) (2010) (explaining Class A license only permit authorizing holder to carry
concealed firearm); see also Howard v. Chief of Police, 794 N.E.2d 604, 606-07 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (explaining
police chief of Massachusetts town or city has right to grant license to carry).
46
Powell, 783 F.3d at 355-56.
47
Id. at 355.
48
Id. at 350.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Powell, 783 F.3d at 350.
45

However, the majority in Powell, relied on Com. v. Jones, stating that the absence of a
license is not ‘an element of the crime,’ as that phrase is commonly used.52 In the absence of
evidence with respect to a license, no issue is presented with respect to licensing.53 In other words,
the burden is on the defendant to come forward with evidence of the defense.54 If such evidence is
presented, however, the burden is on the prosecution to persuade the trier of facts beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defense does not exist.55 In essence the burden-shifting device created
by Massachusetts General Laws chapter 278, section 7 accords with due process.56
The majority’s view is more reasonable because it’s interpretation follows three decades
of precedent after Jones was decided.57 Although the wording of the relevant case law through the
years has muddied the water, the intent of the statute is not to punish someone simply for not
having a license to carry.58 At court the accused can present evidence of a license, which then
shifts the burden of proof as to the license on the prosecution.59
The question that remains is whether the statute is constitutional. The answer to this
question depends on whether there exists a fundamental right to possess a firearm outside of the
home for self-defense. To examine this we look at Powell in more depth.
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE CIRCUIT SPLIT- EXAMING POWELL

52

Id. at 339 (1st Cir. 2015), citing Com. v. Jones, 372 Mass. 403, 406, 361 N.E.2d 1308, 1311 (1977).
Jones, 361 N.E.2d at 1311.
54
Id.
55
Id. listing Cf. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 350 N.E.2d 444 (1976) (defense of insanity); Commonwealth v.
Rodriguez 352 N.E.2d 203 (1976) (self-defense).
56
Powell, 783 F.3d at 350, (summarizing the majority’s conclusion).
57
Id. at 339.
58
Id.
59
Id.
53

The First Circuit, in Powell held a state law that creates an evidentiary presumption that
possession of a firearm outside the home is unlawful does not clearly violate the U.S.
Constitution.60 Petitioner Aaron Powell was convicted on several state charges including unlawful
possession of a loaded firearm,61 which were affirmed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court.62 Powell then sought federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which was denied
by the district court.63
Powell argued that the lack of license presumption infringes on his Second Amendment
rights as secured under Heller and McDonald.64 According to Powell, these decisions “restored
the presumption of innocence, invalidating statutes like [section 7]” that impose criminal
punishment on persons simply for exercising their Second Amendment rights.65
The First Circuit distinguished Heller, and McDonald, by stating that while the Supreme
Court spoke of a right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to keep and bear arms “in case of
confrontation” outside the context of an organized militia,66 it did not say, and to date has not said,
that publicly carrying a firearm unconnected to defense of hearth and home and unconnected to
militia service is a definitive right of private citizens protected under the Second Amendment.67
The First Circuit went on to acknowledge that the debate continues among courts.68 The First
Circuit cited conflicting views in the Ninth, Third, Seventh, and Fourth Circuits.69

60

Id. at 340.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, §§ 10(a), (h), (n).
62
See Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Mass. 572, 946 N.E.2d 114 (2011).
63
Powell, 783 F.3d at 334.
64
Id. at 345.
65
Id.
66
Heller, 554 U.S. at 582–92, 128 S.Ct. 2783; see McDonald, 130 S.Ct. at 3036–42, 3048.
67
Powell, 783 F.3d at 348.
68
Id.
69
Compare Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1149–66 (9th Cir.2014), request for rehearing en banc
granted, 781 F.3d 1106, 2015 WL 1381752 (9th Cir.2015) (No. 10–56971); See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430–
61

The First Circuit repeated its position to not weigh in on the scope of the Second
Amendment as to carrying firearms outside the vicinity of the home without any reference to
protection of the home.70 The First Circuit subsequently stated that it has held that any individual
right “in carrying concealed weapons outside the home is distinct from [the] core interest
emphasized in Heller,” and that under Heller, “[l]icensing of the carrying of concealed weapons
is presumptively lawful.”71 Finally the First Circuit concluded that Powell's Second Amendment
claim provided no grounding for setting aside his state firearms convictions.72
The First Circuit seems to suggest a very narrow reading of Heller, by saying it the does
not even suggest that a right exists as to carrying a firearm outside the home for self-defense.
Somewhat similarly to the First Circuit, the Fourth Circuit has held there may or may not be a
Second Amendment right in some places beyond the home, but we have no idea what those places
are, what the criteria for selecting them should be, what sliding scales of scrutiny might apply to
them, or any one of a number of other questions.73 The Court noted the dilemma faced by lower
courts in the post-Heller world, which is how far to push Heller beyond its undisputed core
holding.74 The court thought it prudent to await direction from the Court itself on the question of
Heller's applicability outside the home environment.75

31 (3d Cir.2013), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 2134, 188 L.Ed.2d 1124 (2014); Woollard, 712 F.3d at 874–76; Moore v.
Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935–36 (7th Cir.2012), with Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1179–91 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Drake,
724 F.3d at 444–46 (Hardiman, J., dissenting); Moore, 702 F.3d at 944–49 (Williams, J., dissenting); see also
United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 467–68, 474–76 (4th Cir.2011).
70
Hightower, 693 F.3d at 72.
71
Id. at 72-74 & n. 8.
72
Powell, 783 F.3d at 348-49.
73
Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 467–68, 474–76.
74
Id. at 475.
75
Id. See also Williams v. State, 417 Md. 479, 10 A.3d 1167, 1177 (2011) (“If the Supreme Court, in [McDonald's ]
dicta, meant its holding to extend beyond home possession, it will need to say so more plainly.”); see also Sims v.
United States, 963 A.2d 147, 150 (D.C.2008).

The Second Circuit has held that the Second Amendment must have some application in
the very different context of the public possession of firearm.76 In Kachalsky v. Cnty. of
Westchester, Plaintiffs challenged a New York legislation that prevented individuals from
obtaining a full-carry concealed-handgun license to possess concealed firearm in public, in general
and not for specific purposes such as hunting and target practice, except upon showing of “proper
cause,” as interpreted by courts to require that these individuals demonstrate a special need for
self-protection distinguishable from that of the general community.77 Plaintiffs argued that the
Second Amendment guarantees them a right to possess and carry weapons in public to defend
themselves from dangerous confrontation and that New York cannot constitutionally force them
to demonstrate proper cause to exercise that right.78 The Court concluded that intermediate scrutiny
was appropriate in this case because their tradition so clearly indicates a substantial role for state
regulation of the carrying of firearms in public.79 It determined that the proper cause requirement
passes constitutional muster if it is substantially related to the achievement of an important
governmental interest.80 Also the Court found that New York has substantial, indeed compelling,
governmental interests in public safety and crime prevention.81 Finally the Court concluded that
the proper cause requirement was substantially related the State’s interests.82 In making the

76

Kachalsky, 701 F.3d 81, cert. denied sub nom., Kachalsky v. Cacace, 2013 BL 100186 (U.S. 2013).
Id. at 97.
78
Id. at 88.
79
Id. at 96-97.
80
Id. at 96-97 See, e.g., Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 471; Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641–42; see also Ernst J. v. Stone, 452
F.3d 186, 200 n. 10 (2d Cir.2006) (“[T]he label ‘intermediate scrutiny’ carries different connotations depending on
the area of law in which it is used.”).
81
Id. at 97 (2d Cir. 2012) See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro–Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 376, 117 S.Ct. 855, 137 L.Ed.2d
1 (1997); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining
& Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 300, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981); Kuck v. Danaher, 600 F.3d 159, 166
(2d Cir.2010).
82
Id.
77

determination, the court reasoned that “substantial deference to the predictive judgments of [the
legislature]” is warranted.83
The Third Circuit has recognized that the Second Amendment right may have some
application beyond the home.84 In Drake v. Filko, Appellants challenged New Jersey's Handgun
Permit Law, which requires that individuals who desire a permit to carry a handgun in public must
apply to the chief police officer in their municipality or to the superintendent of the state police.85
The chief police officer or superintendent considers the application in accordance with the
following provisions of the Handgun Permit Law:
No application shall be approved by the chief police officer or the
superintendent unless the applicant demonstrates that he is not
subject to any of the disabilities set forth in 2C:58–3c. [which
includes numerous criminal history, age and mental health
requirements], that he is thoroughly familiar with the safe handling
and use of handguns, and that he has a justifiable need to carry a
handgun.86
One of the Appellants arguments was that “[t]ext, history, tradition and precedent all
confirm that [individuals] enjoy a right to publicly carry arms for their defense.87 The court rejected
the Appellants' contention that a historical analysis leads inevitably to the conclusion that the
Second Amendment confers upon individuals a right to carry handguns in public for self-defense.88
Second Circuit in Kachalsky observed that “[h]istory and tradition do not speak with one voice
here.”89 What history demonstrates is that states often disagreed as to the scope of the right to bear
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arms, whether the right was embodied in a state constitution or the Second Amendment.” 90 The
Court ultimately declined to definitively declare that the individual right to bear arms for the
purpose of self-defense extends beyond the home, the “core” of the right as identified by Heller.91
However the Court did recognize that the Second Amendment's individual right to bear arms may
have some application beyond the home.92
The opposing view comes from the Seventh Circuit, which has expressly held that a right
to bear arms thus implies a right to carry a loaded gun outside the home.93 In Moore v. Madison,
the court examined the constitutionality of an Illinois law, which forbids a person, with exceptions
mainly for police and other security personnel, hunters, and members of target shooting clubs, to
carry a gun ready to use (loaded, immediately accessible—that is, easy to reach—and uncased).94
The appellants argued that the Illinois law violates the Second Amendment as interpreted in
Heller.95 Heller held that the Second Amendment protects “the right of law-abiding, responsible
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.96
In its decision, the Court focused on the original intent of the framers. The Court also
interpreted what the terms of the Second Amendment meant given the historical context of when
the Bill of rights was enacted. It found that the right to “bear” as distinct from the right to “keep”
arms is unlikely to refer to the home.97 To speak of “bearing” arms within one's home would at all
times have been an awkward usage.98 By awkward usage the court meant that one does not usually
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“bear” arms at home, they “keep” arms at home.99 The framers intended to restrict people from the
usage of guns outside the household, not inside the household. The Second Amendment provides
that there is a right to “bear” arms, which according to the Seventh Circuit, meant possess a firearm
outside the home. The court ultimately held a right to bear arms thus implies a right to carry a
loaded gun outside the home.100 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that this right is appropriate
considering the implications of the right.101 The Seventh Circuit stated that, just because Heller
and McDonald noted that the right to possess a firearm for self-defense was strongest inside the
home,102 that doesn’t mean that the right to possess a firearm outside the home was not
important.103 The Seventh Circuit further reasoned that Heller guaranteed a right to carry in case
of confrontation, and, therefore, by implication, the Second Amendment protected a right to carry
outside of the home because “[c]onfrontations are not limited to the home.”104
Similarly in the Ninth Circuit case Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, a California statute was
challenged which generally prohibited the open or concealed carriage of a handgun, whether
loaded or unloaded, in public locations.105 Peruta sued the County in which he lived in after they
denied his application for a concealed carry license.106 Puerta sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

99

Id.
Id.
101
Ryan Notarangelo, Carrying the Second Amendment Outside of the Home: A Critique of the Third Circuit's
Decision in Drake v. Filko, 64 Cath. U. L. Rev. 235, 248 (2014) citing Moore, 702 F.3d at 935. Discussing Heller,
the court stated that it cannot “ignore the implication of the analysis that the constitutional right of armed selfdefense is broader than the right to have a gun in one's home.” Id.
102
Moore, 702 F.3d at 935.
103
Id. The court continued its analysis of Heller and McDonald by adding that “‘the need for defense of self, family,
and property is most acute’ in the home, but that doesn't mean it is not acute outside of the home.” Id. (citation
omitted) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008)).
104
Id. at 936; see also id. at 935-36 (stating that “Heller repeatedly invokes a broader Second Amendment right than
the right to have a gun in one's home, as when it says that the amendment ‘guarantee[s] the individual right to
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”’ (alteration in original) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 592)).
105
Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2014), . See also Cal.Penal Code § 25400
(prohibiting concealed carry of a firearm); id. § 25850 (prohibiting carry of a loaded firearm); id. § 26350
(prohibiting open carry of an unloaded firearm); see also id. § 25605 (exempting the gun owner's residence, other
private property, and place of business from section 25400 and section 26350).
106
Id. at 1148.
100

requesting injunctive and declaratory relief from the enforcement of the County policy's
interpretation of “good cause.”107 Peruta's main argument was that, by denying him the ability to
carry a loaded handgun for self-defense, the County infringed his right to bear arms under the
Second Amendment.108 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the right to bear arms includes the right
to carry an operable firearm outside the home for the lawful purpose of self-defense.109 The Ninth
Circuit noted that their reading of the Second Amendment was akin to the Seventh Circuit's
interpretation in Moore,110 and at odds with the approach of the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits
in Drake,111 Woollard,112 and Kachalsky.113 The Ninth circuit critiqued the decisions of the Second,
Third, and Fourth Circuits contrary to the approach in Heller, declining to undertake a complete
historical analysis of the scope and nature of the Second Amendment right outside the home, which
was contrary to Heller.114 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that as a result, the three circuits
misapprehend both the nature of the Second Amendment right and the implications of state laws
that prevent the vast majority of responsible, law-abiding citizens from carrying in public for
lawful self-defense purposes.115
ANALYSIS
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A.) FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS OUTSIDE THE HOME FOR SELF-DEFENSE
When analyzing this split, the first question to consider is whether a fundamental right to
possess a firearm outside the home for self-defense exists.116 Although confronted with this
question, the First Circuit declined to recognize any right. The First Circuit has expressed its
skepticism by hinting that they would likely reject that Heller, extends to any right outside the
home.117 The First Circuit takes this position despite acknowledging that other circuits have
answered the question in the affirmative.118
However the original intent of the Second Amendment, and the case law support that there
does in fact exist a right under the Second Amendment to possess a firearm outside the home for
self-defense.119 The First Circuit’s reasoning is flawed because they fail to recognize the
importance that self-defense plays in the purpose of the Second Amendment. Both Heller and
McDonald held the that the Second Amendment protects the individual “right to keep and bear
arms for the purpose of self-defense.120 Self-defense against the government as well as against
people is fundamental to the Second Amendment.121 Also the First Circuit did not properly
interpret the plain meaning of the terms in the Second Amendment. The right to “bear” arms
implies that there exists some right to bear arms outside the home because of the word “bear.”
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Instead the Seventh and the Ninth Circuits’ approach to determine whether a right to
possess a firearm outside the home is better reasoned. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits analyze
both the plain meaning of the of the words used in Second Amendment at the time the Bill of
Rights was enacted, as well as the historical context.122 The Second Amendment states in its
entirety “a well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed” (emphasis added).123 The Seventh Circuit
interprets the right to “bear” as distinct from the right to “keep” arms is unlikely to refer to the
home.124 To speak of “bearing” arms within one's home would at all times have been an awkward
usage.125 Therefore they conclude that a right to bear arms thus implies a right to carry a loaded
gun outside the home.126 The word “bear” is synonymous with “carry” or “produce.” Bear refers
to taking or carrying something away.
The Seventh Circuit also looked at the historical context of the Second Amendment. The
court stated “one doesn't have to be a historian to realize that a right to keep and bear arms for
personal self-defense in the eighteenth century could not rationally have been limited to the
home.”127 The court gave the example of a person who lived in the Wild West, where there were
conflicts with the Native Americans.128 In that situation the court reasoned that, “one would need
from time to time to leave one's home to obtain supplies from the nearest trading post, and en route
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one would be as much (probably more) at risk if unarmed as one would be in one's home
unarmed.”129
The court then acknowledged that many of the dangers that were prevalent at the time of
the framers do not exist anymore, however “a Chicagoan is a good deal more likely to be attacked
on a sidewalk in a rough neighborhood than in his apartment on the 35th floor of the Park Tower.130
A woman who is being stalked or has obtained a protective order against a violent ex-husband is
more vulnerable to being attacked while walking to or from her home than when inside.”131
Although the court overstates the importance of guns, the truth is we unfortunately do not yet live
in a world where guns are no longer needed, at least in very specific circumstances. And even if
we did live in that world, there could be an argument made that any outright ban on the right to
possess a firearm outside the home for self-defense should come from the amendment process and
not left up to the individual states. One reason would be because potential Privilege and Immunities
Clause issues could surface.
All things considered, the more reasonable argument is that there does exist a fundamental
right to possess a firearm outside the home for self-defense. It is the more reasonable argument
based on the purpose, the interpretation of the language, the case law (Heller and McDonald), and
the historical context of the Second Amendment is. The next question to address is how far does
this right extend? Does it extend past self-defense? What weapons may be carried outside the home
for self-defense? Most importantly, what level of judicial scrutiny applies to the right?
B.) LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT AND THE LEVEL OF JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
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The framers of the Bill of Rights purposefully left the Second Amendment broad so that
the States could regulate the right to bear arms with broad discretion. This would follow the general
framework of the Constitution as a whole. The Constitution is a living-breathing document. The
Constitution was set up as a guidepost that could withstand new, novel issues that would arise in
our country’s future. The framers could not have set up a document that governed every aspect of
our lives. Such a document would have been impossible to create and in some cases rendered
useless because of how much our society has changed. What the framers set out to do was set up
broad guidelines for the States to use in order to set up more detailed regulations. The fundamental
rights of the Second Amendment are just that, broad guidelines. However they are by no means
absolute. The rights must be regulated through proper legislation. There needs to be limits placed
on the Second Amendment, and those limitations must be constitutional.
Some circuits like the First Circuit have mistakenly failed to extend the right to bear arms
outside the home for several reasons. First the Circuit might believe that if they open the door to
recognize a right to possess a firearm outside the home for self-defense, then that could lead to the
right being extended even further. In essence what the Circuit is arguing is slippery slope argument.
Further the Circuit might not want to recognize the right because then that right would be
considered a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny review. Finally, the Circuit might just not
want to recognize the right because the Supreme Court has not yet done so. However these reasons
are not compelling because even if any given Circuit was to recognize that the Second Amendment
extends past the home for self-defense, the Legislature can still place limits on that right. The
courts cannot violate principles of federalism and perform the role of the Legislature.

For example Powell, where Powell was seen by officers walking near groups of lively
youths that were pointing and shouting at each other.132 When Powell saw the police officers he
was observed moving his hands toward his waist in a manner, which the officers viewed as
consistent with concealing or retrieving contraband.133 He then began to run, and a foot chase
ensued.134 An officer saw Powell clutch a gun and later drop it before he was captured and
arrested.135
Even if Powell had a right to possess a firearm outside the home, that right would still be
subject to limitations.136 For example, the most common requirement is to require a license to carry
a firearm, and Massachusetts does in fact require a license to have a firearm.137 The First Circuit
could have easily acknowledged a Second Amendment right to bear arms outside the home while
still holding that such a right did not protect Powell because he did not have a license. There would
be a difference in the level of judicial scrutiny that applied to that limitation if the First Circuit
recognized that right, but we will return to that point. One way to get around the stricter judicial
scrutiny might be to more carefully draft the statutes. Another way would be to add additional
limits that pass the level of scrutiny. For example, the State may require someone to take some
approved test in order to be allowed to bear arms outside the home. Or the State could require
additional training, safety classes, and educational seminars for those who meet the preliminary
requirements. The State could also try to deter people from violating this right by creating strict
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and harsh punishments for those who do not follow the process to lawfully exercise the right.
Whatever the case may be, the Court would have to rely on the legislature to do their job.
As previously mentioned, one reason the First Circuit did not want to acknowledge a
fundamental right was because the court did not know what standard of judicial review to use.
After Heller, we have seen that limits on the Second Amendment by lower courts have generally
been analyzed under two different standards. The first approach is Justice Antonin Scalia's
majority opinion in Heller heavily emphasized historical investigation of the original meaning and
traditional understandings of the right to keep and bear arms.”138 The Heller majority “also viewed
the right in categorical terms, suggesting that courts should try to clearly demarcate the types of
guns, people, and activities protected” by the Second Amendment.139 It is important to note that
even Justice Scalia’s approach has not specified a particular level of scrutiny or other means-ends
test that should govern Second Amendment issues, although Heller did declare that the right must
be protected by something more demanding than mere rational basis scrutiny. 140 This means that
either strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny applies. Intermediate scrutiny is the statutory
classification must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
the achievement of those objectives.141 With strict scrutiny the statute must fall unless the
government can demonstrate that the classification has been precisely tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.142
The second approach, which has been adopted by most lower courts, is Breyer’s dissent in
Heller. Breyer’s approach favored a more flexible, pragmatic sort of analysis, enabling them to
138
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weigh the burdens imposed by legal limits on firearms against the public policy concerns
motivating such restrictions.143 As a result the emerging consensus in the lower courts was that
constitutional challenges to gun laws should be evaluated under an intermediate scrutiny approach
that was “highly deferential to legislative determinations and [resulted in] all but the most drastic
restrictions on guns being upheld.144
The major fault in Justice Scalia’s approach is that historical inquiries are extremely
difficult and do not produce determinate answers to the types of detailed questions raised by the
array of constitutional challenges being brought against a wide variety of gun laws.145 However,
Justice Breyer’s approach also has a major flaw taking into consideration that there does in fact
exist a fundamental right to possess a firearm outside the home for self-defense. The flaw is that
fundamental rights require that limitations be subject to strict scrutiny.146
So how should this issue be resolved? The Supreme Court should step in and resolve the
issue. The Court has a dilemma. The dilemma is that strict scrutiny applies to fundamental rights.
The right to bear arms is a fundamental right. However the majority of circuits have been applying
intermediate scrutiny to the Second Amendment. How can the Supreme Court provide a flexible
yet constitutional solution?
Perhaps there is a middle ground between the two approaches. This could be accomplished
by limiting the scope of the Second Amendment. One way is for the Supreme Court to formally
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recognize that there is a right to possess a firearm outside the home, but that right only extends to
possessing a firearm outside the home for self-defense.
This approach would set the outer limits of the Second Amendment and establish the
standard of review that has caused so much confusion for the circuits. Taking this approach one
step further, the Supreme Court would then be rejecting the argument that the Second Amendment
grants a general right to carry a firearm outside the home. Therefore possessing a firearm outside
the home for purposes other than self-defense would not be a fundamental right. Furthermore,
possessing a firearm outside the home not for self-defense would be subject to intermediate
scrutiny.
The key to this approach is that the Supreme Court establishes the outer limits of the Second
Amendment. It is key because fundamental rights must be reviewed under strict scrutiny. Although
most courts have applied intermediate scrutiny, the Supreme Court cannot follow that fallacy
because the Second Amendment is a fundamental right. The right to bear arms, deals with personal
autonomy, and the right to privacy. That connection may seem tenuous at first, but the right to bear
arms means the right to protect your home, and yourself. Inherent in the right to privacy is the right
to protect your privacy and yourself. That is why self-defense from the government and from other
people is key to interpreting the meaning, and setting the outer limits of the Second Amendment.
Additionally, this approach would be constitutional unlike how some circuits have been
applying intermediate scrutiny to the possession of a firearm outside the home for self-defense.
This approach is appropriate because strict scrutiny would apply to possessing a firearm inside the
home and outside the home for self-defense. As for possession of a firearm in all other

circumstances, the Supreme Court could choose apply intermediate scrutiny, which most courts
have already chosen to apply.
C.) RE-EXAMING POWELL, UNDER INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
For illustration, looking back at Powell, applying our new approach would result in the
same outcome but with different reasoning. We would first look to see if Powell was exercising a
fundamental right under the Second Amendment. Here, he was not in possession of a firearm at
home.147 Powell was also not in possession of a firearm for the purpose of self-defense.148
In Massachusetts, in order to raise issue of self-defense there must be evidence
warranting at least a reasonable doubt that the defendant:
(1) had reasonable ground to believe and actually did believe that he was in imminent
danger of death or serious bodily harm, from which he could save himself only by
using deadly force,
(2) had availed himself of all proper means to avoid physical combat before resorting
to the use of deadly force, and
(3) used no more force that was reasonably necessary in all the circumstances of the
case.149
Because Powell was not in possession of a firearm for self-defense he would not have a
fundamental right in that situation. Therefore, the court would review any limits on the right he
had using intermediate scrutiny.
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Additionally in Powell, the State could require that only arms typically possessed by lawabiding citizens for lawful purposes, including handguns be used for self-protection. This
requirement would be a limit on a fundamental right and would be subject to strict scrutiny.
D.) WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RESOLVE THIS DISPUTE
Powell is not the appropriate case for the Supreme Court to grant cert in order to address
the issue of the whether a right to bear arms outside the home exists for self-defense because the
Supreme Court would not be directly presented with that issue. Powell was not possessing a
firearm outside the home for self-defense. Therefore it would be inappropriate for the Supreme
Court to rule on that point. However Powell illustrates the tension in the First Circuit in addressing
the right to posses a firearm outside the home. Powell also illustrates the need to set a clear judicial
standard of review for the Second Amendment.
One potential reason the Supreme Court has been reluctant to extend its decision in Heller
would be that the court is worried about the political backlash they could face. The Supreme Court
might not want to expressly state that there is a fundamental right to possess a firearm that extends
outside the home considering all the recent public outcry for increased gun control.
Given the right set facts, the Supreme Court should address the issue in order to clarify the
issue not only for the courts but also for the legislative branch. The Supreme Court has a huge
impact on public discourse.150 The legislature would benefit from a clear understanding of the
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Second Amendment because they would be able to enact more effective laws. The legislature
would be able to tailor their laws in order to withstand the level of judicial scrutiny.
Gun control is a heavily debated topic.151 The Legislature has recently been under a lot of
pressure to increase Gun Control.152 President Obama gave a speech where he advocated for the
need for heightened restrictions to respond to the gun violence in the U.S.153 On May 4, 2013,
before the National Rifle Association's (NRA) annual convention, Texas Senator Ted Cruz then
promised that he, along with fellow Tea Party Conservatives Kentucky Senator Rand Paul and
Utah Senator Mike Lee, would make sure to “filibuster any legislation that undermines the Bill of
Rights or the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.154 It appears that significant gun
regulation will not occur unless the Supreme Court identifies the outer limits of the Second
Amendment because many states are unwilling to close the door on the Second Amendment
granting some fundamental right to possess a firearm outside the home for purposes other than
self-defense. If the Supreme Court would limit the Second amendment to only protecting a right
to possess a firearm outside the home for self-defense, it would be interesting to see the creative
ways the Legislature could try to decrease gun violence. Moreover, it would be interesting to see
if there are any substantial differences in the type of legislation States try to pass, and whether
strict scrutiny has any effect on legislation already in place.

151

The Controversy of Gun Control, Open Discussions About Various Controversies, http://openreader.org/thecontroversy-of-gun-control/ (last visited Feb. 02, 2016).
152
GOP scrambles for response to Obama's gun control actions, 2016 WL 60556.
153
Id.
154
Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: What Hath Heller Wrought?, 23 Wm. &
Mary Bill Rts. J. 1143 (2015), (citing Nat'l Rifle Ass'n, Ted Cruz at National Rife Association Convention, YouTube
(Feb. 02, 2016), at 3:07-3:20, https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=dFLUzObt2a0 (excerpt from Ted Cruz's speech
before the 2013 National Rifle Association Convention)).

CONCLUSION
A fundamental right exists to possess a firearm outside the home for self-defense. That
right is considered a fundamental right in which strict scrutiny applies. Possession of a firearm
outside the home for reasons other than self-defense is not fundamental right, and is subject to
intermediate scrutiny. When re-examining Powell, we find that the court can achieve the same
outcome with constitutionally sound reasoning. Ultimately, the level of judicial scrutiny might
not end up making that much of a difference. Many laws that are currently passed under
intermediate scrutiny would probably pass under strict scrutiny as well. However it would be
interesting to see what new legislation that States would be confident enough to pass if the
Supreme Court specified the outer limit of the Second Amendment was possession of a firearm
for the purpose of self-defense.

